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Income Taxation of U.S. Households: Basic Facts
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We use micro data from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service to document how households’ tax 
liabilities vary with income, marital status and the number of dependents. We report facts on 
the distributions of average and marginal taxes, properties of the joint distributions of taxes 
paid and income, and discuss how taxes are affected by marital status and the number of 
children. The data reveals a large dispersion in tax rates and taxes paid. Ranking households 
according to the average tax rates they face, those at top 1% face taxes in excess of 27.5%, 
while the median tax rate is about 8%. About 14.5% of married and 31.8% of unmarried 
households do not pay any taxes. Given the progressivity in the system, tax liabilities are 
more unequally distributed than income. The top 5% (1%) of households account for 54% 
(34.8%) of total tax liabilities, while top 5% (1%) of households have 34.8% (20.3%) of total 
income. We also provide parametric estimates of tax functions for use in applied work in 
macroeconomics and public finance. 
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This paper has two goals. First, we aim to systematically describe how taxes paid by a
cross-section of U.S. households vary according to their income, marital status and number
of dependent children. Second, we provide estimates of e⁄ective tax functions that capture
the observed heterogeneity in the data that can be readily used in applied work.
Both goals above are motivated by the large and growing body of literature that utilizes
dynamic macroeconomic models with heterogeneous households; see Heathcote, Storesletten
and Violante (2009) for a recent survey. This literature has studied how existing models
can account for properties of actual earnings, income and wealth distributions, and has used
such models to address a host of policy questions.1 As an input in this process, a large
body of work, old and new and from related ￿elds, documented the empirical properties of
such distributions. However, the distribution of taxes e⁄ectively paid by households and the
marginal tax rates that they face have received much less attention. This paper ￿lls this
void, by systematically documenting basic properties of the structure of income taxation for
a cross section of U.S. households.
The model economies studied in the above mentioned literature require, in accordance
with data, a mapping of household￿ s income to taxes paid conceivably depending on the
household￿ s marital status and the presence of children. This naturally matters when asking
how well models with heterogeneous households match distributional properties of data, as
well as for the fruitful use of these frameworks to address policy questions. A ready-to-use,
systematic representation of this mapping is not currently available for di⁄erent types of
households, and we o⁄er it here. Therefore, we provide di⁄erent parametric estimates of
e⁄ective taxes as a function of household￿ s income for di⁄erent types of households; all,
married, unmarried, with and without dependent children.
We use a large cross-sectional data set from U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for our
purposes (￿ Public Use Tax File￿ ), that is representative of the entire set of U.S. taxpayers. For
a notion of e⁄ective average tax rates, we ￿nd a substantial degree of heterogeneity implied
by the U.S. income tax system and the underlying distribution of income. As we document,
average rates increase non trivially with income, and this is re￿ ected in the distribution of
average tax rates paid. For instance, if we rank the married households by average tax rates
1There is a large literature tax uses dynamic macroecomic models with heterogenous agents to study
tax reforms. See Ventura (1999), Altig, Auerbach, Kotliko⁄, Smetters and Walliser (2001), Castaæeda,
D￿az-JimØnez and R￿os-Rull (2003), D￿az-JimØnez and Pijoan-Mas (2005), Nishiyama and Smetters (2005),
Conesa and Krueger (2006), Erosa and Koreshkova (2007), and Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2009), among
others. Guvenen, Kuruscu and Ozkan (2009) study the e⁄ect of taxes on human capital accumulation and
inequality.
2that they face, average taxes at top 1% are in excess of 27.5%, while the median tax rate
is about 8%. These facts, in conjunction with the substantial income dispersion that we
document in this data, implies that households at the top of the income distribution account
for the bulk of taxes paid; the top 5% accounts for nearly 54% of all taxes paid, whereas the
top 1% accounts for about 34.8%.
Using this data, we estimate two functional forms for e⁄ective tax rates. In each case,
we report estimates for all households, as well as for married and unmarried households
with di⁄erent numbers of dependent children. We ￿rst estimate a two-parameter speci￿ca-
tion, which we refer to as the log speci￿cation. Our second set of estimates is for the same
functional form used in Gouveia and Strauss (1994), who provided estimates of tax func-
tions for all taxpayers using the U.S. tax structure prevailing in 1989.2 We ￿nd that both
speci￿cations provide tax schedules for average rates that are quite similar. We also ￿nd
that the implied schedules of marginal tax rates, computed from the e⁄ective tax functions,
di⁄er substantially from statutory rates. In addition, the schedules become essentially ￿ at
after relatively low levels of income under the Gouveia and Strauss speci￿cation. The log
speci￿cation, in contrast, generates marginal rates that increase with income as in the tax
law.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic data that we use in our
calculations afterwards. Section 3 describes how e⁄ective average tax rates (and reported
marginal tax rates) by households vary in cross section according to income, depending
on marital status and the number of dependent children. Section 4 reports facts on the
distribution of tax rates and taxes paid. Section 6 o⁄ers the parametric estimates for tax
functions. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
We use data from the Internal Revenue Service 2000 Public Use Tax File. With 145,663
records, it is a representative subsample of the universe of U.S. taxpayers who ￿led taxes
in the year 2000. Since this data e⁄ectively contains no restrictions on income, either at
the bottom or at the top, it allows for a comprehensive representation of income and tax
2Several papers estimated e⁄ective tax rates for the use in representative-agent models. See, for instance,
Joines (1981), Seater (1982), Barro and Sahasakul (1983) for papers that used IRS data, and Mendoza,
Razin and Tesar (1994) who estimated e⁄ective taxes for a large set of countries using national accounts and
revenue statistics. Di⁄erently from these papers, Gouveia and Strauss (1994) used IRS data to estimate tax
functions￿ average tax rates as a function of household income.
3liabilities.3
The notion of income that we use is standard in cross-sectional studies and encompasses
all income ￿ ows accruing to households; labor income, asset income from di⁄erent sources
and transfers. It corresponds closely to the notion employed by Gouveia and Strauss (1994).
We de￿ne income to include
￿ Salaries and wages;
￿ Interest income (taxable and not taxable);
￿ Dividends;
￿ Business or professional income;
￿ Total pensions and annuities received plus taxable IRA distributions;
￿ Unemployment compensation;
￿ Social Security bene￿ts;
￿ State income tax refunds and alimony received.
It is worth emphasizing that the notion of income that we use is di⁄erent from the
legal notions Adjusted Gross Income and Taxable Income. Adjusted Gross Income was
computed in 2000 by subtracting from all reported income ￿ ows IRA and other tax deferred
contributions for retirement plans (e.g. 401-k), moving expenses, student loans interest,
alimony paid, contributions to medical income savings accounts, among other items. Taxable
Income is obtained by subtracted personal exemptions and deductions from Adjusted Gross
Income.4
Our notion of Federal taxes is comprehensive as well. It corresponds to total income
taxes owed after Credits (including the Earned-Income Tax credit).5 From this notion of
tax liabilities, we calculate for our purposes e⁄ective average tax rates. Reported marginal
tax rates correspond to the statutory marginal rates for each household given their taxable
income in the data.
3For details on variable de￿nitions, weights used and other technical details, see the Individual Tax File
Sample Description booklet that accompanies the data.
4In terms of deductions, households can choose between a lump-sum standard deduction or multiple
itemized deductions, the most common of which corresponds to mortgage interest paid.
5More speci￿cally, we use the variable TOTAL INCOME TAX (E06500) in the 2000 Public Use Tax File.
4Sample Restrictions Households are included in the sample if (i) their income is
higher than $5;000, which is roughly equivalent to half of the hypothetical income of a
worker, who works at the minimum wage ($5:15 in the year 2000); (ii) their average tax
rate is less than 40%. The second restriction eliminates those with reported taxes higher
than the top marginal tax rate, 39.5%. The resulting average level of income is US$ 58,375.
The corresponding average level of household income from Current Population Survey (CPS)
data is only slightly lower: US$ 57,121.
2.1 Statutory Taxes in 2000
Before presenting and discussing results on taxes paid by income, household structure and
number of children, it is worth reporting the structure of statutory income taxes in 2000.
Table 1 summarizes this information for three relevant categories: married ￿ling jointly,
single and head of household. Tax brackets are presented as de￿ned in the law, according to
the legal notion of Taxable Income.
As the table shows, marginal tax rates range from 15% to 39.5%. The standard deduc-
tion for married people is not twice the standard deduction for singles. A similar remark
applies to the width of the tax brackets. Very importantly, there is a wide range of in-
come for which marginal tax rates are unchanged; for instance, from $ 43,850 to $ 161,450
for married households, marginal rates change by only three percentage points (from 28
to 31 percent). Afterwards, marginal rates increase non-trivially for high- income earners;
to 36 and 39.6 percent, respectively. Altogether, these features contribute to generate the
substantial di⁄erences in average tax rates across income levels displayed in Table 1.
2.2 Descriptive Income Statistics
For a better understanding on the facts about tax liabilities in cross section, it is of interest
to report on the properties of the distribution of income in the tax data. This is of interest,
since as the data is representative of the entire universe of U.S. taxpayers, there are no
top-coding restrictions as in other commonly used data sets (e.g. PSID, CPS).
Table 2 summarizes the properties of the income distribution and highlights the sub-
stantial degree of concentration of income at the top. The richest 20% of households earns
about 59.3% of total income, whereas the top 10%, 5% and 1% earn about 45.0%, 34.8%
and 20.3%, respectively. From the Table also transpires the importance of the very rich: the
top 0.5% earn about 16.2% of income.
Table 2 also shows the varying composition of income as income increases. The last
5columns in the upper panel display the fraction of income corresponding to capital income
at di⁄erent quintiles for two concepts of capital income. The ￿rst concept of capital in-
come, includes all interest income, dividends, 1=3 of business income, capital gains, rental
+ royalties income and 1=3 of farm income.6 The more comprehensive second one, adds to
the previous one all pension and annuity payments. In both cases, and as expected, capital
income as a share of total income rises rapidly as income goes up. Note that at the very top,
almost half of income accrues from capital income under the ￿rst de￿nition (about 48.2%),
whereas under the second notion about 59.5% of income derives from capital income. This is
obviously relevant for economic purposes; high income households face much higher marginal
tax rates (see below) and capital income is concentrated there.
It is important to relate these summary distributional statistics to standard summary
measures of income inequality. For instance, CPS data indicates that each quantile earned
in 2000 about 3.6, 8.9, 14.8, 23.0 and 49.8 percent of income respectively, whereas the top
5% earned about 22.1 percent with a Gini coe¢ cient of about 46.2.7 The tax data shows
that each quintile earned about 3.4, 6.9, 11.6, 18.8 and 59.3 percent, respectively, whereas
the top 5% earned about 34.8% with a Gini coe¢ cient of about 0.554. Clearly, and as
also emphasized by others (e.g. Piketty and Saez 2003), the degree of income concentration
from tax data is substantially higher than the degree of income concentration emerging from
standard data sets.
3 Income Taxes in Cross Section
In this section we report basic facts on how average and marginal tax rates vary according
to our broad notion of income, marital status and the number of children. We proceed
by dividing households in cells determined by multiples of mean income, where each cell
captures all households whose income is at half the distance between the next upper and
lower cell. The lowest multiple covers all income below it, whereas the highest income covers
all income above it.
For each cell, we calculate the e⁄ective average rate, de￿ned as the average ratio of taxes
paid to household￿ s income in the cell. The marginal rate that we report corresponds to the
one faced by households in their tax ￿ling, averaged across all households in the cell. Thus,
the marginal tax rate reported corresponds to mean statutory marginal rates. We also report
the standard deviation for average and marginal tax rates in each cell. Finally, we also report
6We allocate 1=3 of business and farm income according to standard estimates of the share of capital
income in total income.
7See http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/index.html
6the ratio of marginal to average taxes for each cell, as a measure of the progressivity of the
tax system.
3.1 Married and Unmarried Households
Tables 3 and 4 show the ￿ndings for married and unmarried households. Married households
correspond to those ￿ling as married ￿ling jointly, whereas unmarried households encompass
all those ￿ling as single and as head of household. We explicitly include head of households
in our unmarried group, as this category is designed for households headed with unmarried
individuals with dependents.
A central ￿nding from Tables 3 and 4 is that e⁄ective average rates increase substantially
as income increases. Increasing household income from the mean income level to ￿ve times
mean income (i.e. from $58,375 to about $291,875), increases the mean, e⁄ectively-paid
average tax rate, from about 8.8% to 20.5% for married households, and from 14.2% to
20.2% for unmarried households. In terms marginal rates, the increase goes from 18.9% to
34.0% for married households, and from 26.2% to 32.5% for unmarried ones. For ten times
mean income, average (marginal) rates are 24.3% (36.9%) for married households and 23.1%
(35.0%) for unmarried ones. Hence, from these ￿ndings it is clear that there is a non-trivial
degree of tax progressivity built in the tax system. This is also illustrated in ratio of marginal
to average tax rates. In Tables 3 and 4 (as well as in similar tables that follow), this ratio
is substantially higher than 1 at low incomes levels and declines rather monotonically to
numbers around 1.3-1.8 at higher income levels.8
From Tables 3 and 4 also transpire that there are substantial di⁄erences in average rates
between married and unmarried households. At low levels of income, e⁄ective rates are
substantially higher for unmarried households, while these rates subsequently converge as
income increases. This is due to a host of factors; children, di⁄erences in standard deductions
as well as di⁄erences in the width of tax brackets. These factors are arguably more important
in reducing average rates at lower levels of income. For instance, children are concentrated
in married households and they lead to higher personal exemptions and tax credits, thereby
reducing average rates for these households.
We now try to illustrate the e⁄ects of the di⁄erential tax treatment of married and single
households in the United States. To isolate these e⁄ects, we use data that is not a⁄ected
by the presence of children (Tables 5 and 8). Consider for instance a married household
with an income level equal to twice the mean income level. If both wife and husband have
the same income, their tax liabilities are higher when married; they would pay as a married
8Prescott (2004) uses a ratio of 1.6 for the U.S. economy.
7household an e⁄ective average rate of about 15.7% whereas as two single individuals, they
would pay about 15.3% each. At another extreme, if only one of them earns an income of
twice mean income, the average rate would be about 17.1% if each ￿led as single, whereas
it would be 15.7% if they ￿led as a married couple. Other combinations can be constructed
from these tables, re￿ ecting the fact that two partners of similar incomes face a tax penalty
if they marry, whereas those with su¢ ciently di⁄erent incomes face a tax bonus or subsidy.9
Overall, the discussion above is driven by the fact that in the United States, the unit
subject to taxation is the household, not the individual. The economic implications of this
fact go beyond relative payments when married or single. Consider again a married household
with no children with an income level of twice the mean income level. Table 5 indicates that
this household faces a marginal tax of about 27.7%. If all income is earned by one household
member, the marginal tax on the ￿rst dollar of income earned by the other household member
is also taxed at the same rate, 27.7%. This naturally creates large disincentives for labor
supply of secondary earners. In contrast, if her/his income were treated as an individual
income, the marginal tax rate would be substantially lower.10 If children are present, the
same logic applies.
3.2 The Role of Children
Tables 5, 6 and 7 illustrate the quantitative importance of children in a⁄ecting average
e⁄ective rates for married households, whereas tables 8, 9 and 10 provide the equivalent
information for unmarried households. As we mentioned earlier, for unmarried households,
we use information from the single ￿ling category for those without children, whereas for
those with children we use information from the head of household category.
For married households, children reduce e⁄ective rates albeit the e⁄ect is not substan-
tial. Households with income about twice mean income, face an e⁄ective average rate of
about 15.7% when no children are present, a rate of about 14.1% when two children are
present, and a rate of 12.7% when more than two children are present. Therefore, for these
households, at extremes, the reduction in e⁄ective rates driven by the presence of children is
of about three percentage points. At high levels of income, the corresponding reductions in
average rates is smaller. Meanwhile, for poorer married households the reduction is naturally
9See McCa⁄ery (1997) for a detailed account of the US tax system￿ s treatment of married and single
households. On the optimal taxation of couples, see Boskin and Sheshinski (1983), Apps and Rees (2010),
Alessina, Ichino, and Karabarbounis (2010) and Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2009).
10In Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (2010), we show that these features of the U.S. tax law have large
e⁄ects on labor supply of married females. Kaygusuz (2010) studies how much changes in taxes contributed
to the growth of married female labor supply in the US since 1970s.
8higher; nearly ￿ve percentage points at mean income levels. This is not at all surprising:
children disproportionately a⁄ect tax liabilities of poorer households via lump-sum personal
exemptions and tax credits.
4 The Distribution of Tax Rates and Taxes Paid
We report in this section facts on the distribution of tax rates and the taxes paid. Table 11
describes the basic features of the distribution of average tax rates across households. This
information is also presented graphically in Figure 1. As the table illustrates, a substantial
fraction of households has no tax liabilities: this occurs for about 14.5% of the married group
and for about 31.8% of the unmarried one. Median and mean e⁄ective tax rates are on the
low side for both groups, with a median rate for married households of about 8.0% and a
mean rate for married households of about 8.8%. For unmarried households, the median
rate is of about 5.6% whereas the mean rate equals 6.4%.
The bottom panel of Table 11 shows the tax rates de￿ning the top percentiles. Households
at the top of the distribution face signi￿cantly higher average rates than those around the
middle: the ratio of tax rates de￿ning the top 5% to the median is in excess of a factor of 2
for married households, and of a factor of 3 for unmarried households.
A related question is: How tax liabilities are distributed? Table 12 answers this question,
by calculating the share of total taxes paid by di⁄erent percentiles of the income distribution.
The top 20% of households earns about 59.3% of total income and pays more than three
quarters of total taxes. Similarly, the top 1% earns about 20.3% of total income, yet it
accounts for nearly 35% of total tax collections.
Overall, a clear picture emerges. First, and in connection with the results shown earlier
in section 3.1 on the measured progressivity on the tax schedule, e⁄ective tax rates on most
households are relatively low (below 10%) and di⁄er non trivially from those at the top.
Thus, there is substantial heterogeneity in the tax burden as measured by e⁄ective average
tax rates. Secondly, the provisions in the law, in conjunction with the observed dispersion
in income in the data, lead to the ￿nding that the overwhelming bulk of tax revenues are
concentrated in upper income households.
5 After-Tax Income Distribution
How much before and after-tax income distributions di⁄er? The IRS micro data is ideal to
answer this question. Table 13 shows income distribution statistics before and after taxes.
9Despite the vast heterogeneity we documented earlier in terms of income and tax pay-
ments, the results show a rather limited degree of redistribution stemming from the U.S. tax
system. From Table 13 emerges a clear picture: the shares accruing to each percentile on
the after-tax income distribution are similar to those from the before-tax income distribu-
tion. The same tends to be the case for the summary measures of inequality. For instance,
the Gini coe¢ cient declines slightly from the before-tax to the after-tax income distribution
(0.554 to 0.522).
6 Parametric Estimates
In this section, we provide estimates of tax functions for applied use. Speci￿cally, we posit
parametric functional forms for e⁄ective average tax rates, and estimate the relevant para-
meters for all households, married and unmarried households, distinguishing by the number
of dependent children. As we explain below, the parameters that we estimate can be easily
used in applied work.11
We estimate two speci￿cations for average tax rates. In the ￿rst case, we posit that
t(~ y) = ￿ + ￿ log(~ y);
where t is the average tax rate, and the variable ~ y stands for multiples of mean household
income in the data. That is, a value of ~ y equal to 2.0 implies an average tax rate corresponding
to an actual level of income that is twice the magnitude of mean household income in the
data. We refer to this as the log speci￿cation.
Notice that for this speci￿cation, marginal tax rates, m, are given by
m(~ y) = ￿ + ￿ log(~ y) + ￿ = t(~ y) + ￿: (1)
That is, marginal tax rates di⁄er from average tax rates by the constant factor ￿. In
macroeconomic terms, this speci￿cation is consistent with balanced growth: if all incomes
increase by a given factor, average and marginal tax rates are unchanged, and total taxes
paid increase by the same factor.
In our second speci￿cation, we estimate the same functional form used by Gouveia and
Strauss (1994)
t(y) = b[1 ￿ (sy
p + 1)
￿1=p]:
11Guvenen, Kaygusuz and Ozkan (2009), Huggett and Parra (2010), and Heatchote, Storesletten and
Violante (2011) also estimate e⁄ective tax functions using di⁄erent speci￿cations and data sets.
10In this case, the variable y stands for the level of household income in the data set. We
refer to this as the GS speci￿cation. The corresponding marginal tax function is
m(y) = b[1 ￿ (sy
p + 1)
￿1=p￿1] (2)
Tables 14, 15, 16 and 17 show the parameter estimates for married and unmarried house-
holds, with and without children present in the household.
For illustration purposes, Figure 2 plots the resulting average tax rates under both spec-
i￿cations for the case of all married households. The ￿gure shows that the resulting shape
of average tax rates are quite similar under both cases, and converge to essentially the same
values for high levels of income. Note also that the log speci￿cation yields, not surprisingly,
negative values for su¢ ciently low levels of income. The log speci￿cation implies that a
married household around mean income (twice mean income) has an average rate of about
9.2% (13.7%). The corresponding values under the GS speci￿cation are 8.2% (14.4%).
The reported estimates are quite easy to interpret for the log speci￿cation. Note that
when ~ y equal 1.0, the household income corresponds to mean income, and the average tax
rate equals ￿, and the marginal rate equals ￿ + ￿. The role of children and marital status
are straightforward; average and marginal rates are lower for married households, and tend
to decrease with the presence of children in the household.
Marginal Tax Rates Figure 3 plots the marginal tax rates for the case of married
households implied by our parameter estimates. For the log case, since the marginal rate
di⁄ers from the average rate by the constant factor ￿, marginal rates increase with income
and become closer to average rates as income goes up.
It is important to emphasize that the marginal rates calculated from equations (1) and
(2) are derived from our previous calculation of average e⁄ective rates. As such, they di⁄er
from statutory marginal rates and re￿ ect some (but not all) of the tax distortions on eco-
nomic activity built into the system. E⁄ective rates re￿ ect the inframarginal exemptions,
deductions, etc., that reduce average rates. Yet, for many economic decisions the relevant
marginal rates are those from the actual tax schedule (statutory rates), as they are the oper-
ative ones for decisions on the margin; e.g. to work overtime or not, labor force participation
decisions of secondary earners, buying or selling extra units of assets, etc.
How much do e⁄ective marginal rates di⁄er from statutory rates? This is shown in table
18. For illustration purposes, consider the case of all married households. At mean levels of
income, statutory and marginal tax rates are relatively similar; the mean statutory marginal
rate amounts to about 18.9%, whereas the e⁄ective marginal rates are 15.6% under the log
11speci￿cation and 16.9% under the GS speci￿cation. However, the gap between e⁄ective
and statutory rates grows strongly with income. At a ￿ve-times mean income level, the
statutory rate averages 34%, whereas the e⁄ective marginal rates amount to 25.9% under
the log speci￿cation and 24.5% under the GS speci￿cation. As table 18 illustrates, this gap
is even higher at higher levels of income. It is worth noting that the marginal rates emerging
from the GS speci￿cation become essentially constant after relatively low levels of income
(about twice mean income), which potentially limits their use in applied work. In contrast,
the log speci￿cation, by generating increasing marginal rates as a function of income, better
re￿ ects the distortions on economic activity associated to rising statutory marginal tax rates.
Comparisons with Previous Estimates It is of interest to compare the estimated
tax functions with the existing ones from Gouveia and Strauss (1994), who provided estimates
for e⁄ective rates using data from 1980 and 1989 for all households. This comparison is
displayed in Figure 4, where the corresponding average rates are plotted for these three
years.12
The ￿gure indicates that there are only minor di⁄erences in the resulting average tax
functions between 1989 and 2000. Di⁄erences occur only at higher income levels and are in
the ballpark of one percentage point. The results largely suggest that changes in taxes that
took place in 1991 and 1994 did not a⁄ect e⁄ective average rates signi￿cantly. In contrast,
as the ￿gure demonstrates, the changes in the tax structure that took place in the 1980￿ s,
a⁄ected the shape of average rates signi￿cantly. For higher income households, the di⁄erences
are quite substantial; for instance, at ￿ve time mean income levels, the di⁄erences between
2000 and 1980 is in excess of eleven percentage points.
7 Conclusion
We presented basic facts on the e⁄ective taxation of U.S. households in cross-section, dis-
tinguishing them by their marital status and the number of dependent children. We also
provide parametric estimates of e⁄ective tax functions for two speci￿cations that can be
readily used in applied work.
12For comparison purposes, nominal income has been adjusted, and the estimated parameter s has been
adjusted for 1980 in order to make the comparison possible.
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15Table 1: 2000 Income Tax Schedule
Married Filing Jointly Single Head of Household
Marginal Tax Rate Tax Brackets Tax Brackets Tax Brackets
(Taxable Income) (Taxable Income) (Taxable Income)
15.0% 0 - 43,850 0 - 26,250 0 - 35,150
28.0% 43,850 - 105,950 26,250 - 63,550 35,150 - 90,800
31.0% 105,950 - 161,450 63,550 - 132,600 90,800 - 147,050
36.0% 161,450 - 288,350 132,600 - 288,350 147,050 - 288,350
39.6% over 288,350 over 288,350 over 288,350
Standard
Deduction $7,350 $4,400 $6,450
Personal
Exemption 2,800 2,800 2,800
16Table 2: Income Distribution Statistics
Percentile Share of Contribution of Contribution of
Total Income Capital Income (I) Capital Income (II)
Bottom 20% 3.4% 9.5% 15.5%
20-40 % 6.9% 7.0% 13.8%
40-60 % 11.6% 6.7% 13.3%
60-80 % 18.8% 9.1% 17.0%
80-90 % 14.3% 10.4% 18.1%
90-95 % 10.2% 16.0% 23.7%
95-99 % 14.5% 25.3% 35.6%
99 -99.5 % 4.0% 36.5% 51.3%
99.5-100 % 16.2% 48.2% 59.5%
Other Statistics
Income Share of
Top 20% 59.3% Gini Coe¢ cient 0.554
Top 10% 45.0% Var-log Income 0.85
Top 5% 34.8%
Top 1% 20.3%
Table 3: Descriptive Tax Statistics: Married Households
Multiples of Avg. Tax Rate Marg. Tax Rate Marg./Avg. Avg. Tax Rate Marg. Tax Rate
Mean Income (Mean) (Mean) (St. Dev.) (St. Dev.)
0.10 0.000 0.001 - 0.004 0.012
0.25 0.011 0.073 6.64 0.020 0.075
0.50 0.035 0.132 3.77 0.033 0.049
0.75 0.064 0.147 2.45 0.033 0.021
1.0 0.088 0.189 2.15 0.030 0.061
1.5 0.119 0.264 2.22 0.036 0.044
2.0 0.149 0.277 1.86 0.037 0.029
3.0 0.168 0.297 1.77 0.046 0.036
4.0 0.187 0.326 1.74 0.059 0.049
5.0 0.205 0.340 1.66 0.070 0.052
7.0 0.213 0.355 1.67 0.087 0.065
10.0 0.243 0.369 1.52 0.097 0.059
17Table 4: Descriptive Tax Statistics: Unmarried Households
Multiples of Avg. Tax Rate Marg. Tax Rate Marg./Avg. Avg. Tax Rate Marg. Tax Rate
Mean Income (Mean) (Mean) (St. Deviation) (St. Deviation)
0.10 0.022 0.078 3.55 0.034 0.075
0.25 0.046 0.128 2.78 0.041 0.052
0.50 0.080 0.156 1.95 0.040 0.037
0.75 0.114 0.228 2.00 0.039 0.066
1.0 0.142 0.262 1.85 0.045 0.048
1.5 0.162 0.280 1.73 0.054 0.048
2.0 0.170 0.287 1.69 0.063 0.049
3.0 0.179 0.307 1.72 0.074 0.055
4.0 0.202 0.326 1.61 0.076 0.061
5.0 0.202 0.325 1.61 0.087 0.071
7.0 0.194 0.339 1.75 0.100 0.071
10.0 0.231 0.350 1.52 0.105 0.078
Table 5: Descriptive Tax Statistics: Married Households, No Children
Multiples of Avg. Tax Rate Marg. Tax Rate Marg./Avg. Avg. Tax Rate Marg. Tax Rate
Mean Income (Mean) (Mean) (St. Deviation) (St. Deviation)
0.10 0.000 0.002 - 0.005 0.014
0.25 0.019 0.095 5.00 0.023 0.072
0.50 0.053 0.128 2.42 0.034 0.053
0.75 0.074 0.146 1.97 0.034 0.025
1.0 0.102 0.200 1.96 0.029 0.065
1.5 0.135 0.266 1.97 0.034 0.043
2.0 0.157 0.277 1.76 0.040 0.033
3.0 0.170 0.293 1.72 0.051 0.045
4.0 0.183 0.320 1.75 0.065 0.055
5.0 0.197 0.330 1.68 0.075 0.061
7.0 0.194 0.339 1.75 0.096 0.072
10.0 0.222 0.359 1.62 0.105 0.065
18Table 6: Descriptive Tax Statistics: Married Households, Two Children
Multiples of Avg. Tax Rate Marg. Tax Rate Marg./Avg. Avg. Tax Rate Marg. Tax Rate
Mean Income (Mean) (Mean) (St. Deviation) (St. Deviation)
0.10 0.001 0.001 1.0 0.005 0.012
0.25 0.000 0.039 - 0.002 0.066
0.50 0.015 0.140 9.33 0.019 0.037
0.75 0.052 0.149 2.87 0.022 0.014
1.0 0.073 0.174 2.38 0.022 0.052
1.5 0.107 0.266 2.49 0.029 0.041
2.0 0.141 0.277 1.96 0.032 0.028
3.0 0.167 0.301 1.80 0.040 0.028
4.0 0.187 0.329 1.76 0.058 0.046
5.0 0.213 0.348 1.63 0.064 0.037
7.0 0.233 0.373 1.60 0.071 0.045
10.0 0.270 0.379 1.40 0.078 0.050
Table 7: Descriptive Tax Statistics: Married Households, Two + Children
Multiples of Avg. Tax Rate Marg. Tax Rate Marg./Avg. Avg. Tax Rate Marg. Tax Rate
Mean Income (Mean) (Mean) (St. Deviation) (St. Deviation)
0.10 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000
0.25 0.001 0.007 7.00 0.009 0.032
0.50 0.003 0.117 39.00 0.009 0.062
0.75 0.026 0.147 5.65 0.020 0.019
1.0 0.055 0.161 2.93 0.022 0.041
1.5 0.084 0.247 2.94 0.033 0.057
2.0 0.127 0.276 2.17 0.034 0.025
3.0 0.158 0.296 1.87 0.045 0.034
4.0 0.186 0.332 1.78 0.049 0.038
5.0 0.208 0.345 1.66 0.070 0.045
7.0 0.233 0.372 1.60 0.076 0.046
10.0 0.269 0.381 1.42 0.081 0.047
19Table 8: Descriptive Tax Statistics: Unmarried Households, No Children
Multiples of Avg. Tax Rate Marg. Tax Rate Marg./Avg. Avg. Tax Rate Marg. Tax Rate
Mean Income (Mean) (Mean) (St. Deviation) (St. Deviation)
0.10 0.029 0.103 5.16 0.037 0.069
0.25 0.069 0.142 2.06 0.032 0.033
0.50 0.096 0.159 1.66 0.030 0.042
0.75 0.125 0.251 2.01 0.036 0.057
1.0 0.153 0.268 1.75 0.042 0.042
1.5 0.168 0.283 1.68 0.053 0.049
2.0 0.171 0.287 1.68 0.064 0.051
3.0 0.179 0.308 1.72 0.075 0.055
4.0 0.200 0.324 1.62 0.080 0.064
5.0 0.201 0.323 1.61 0.088 0.073
7.0 0.193 0.337 1.75 0.101 0.071
10.0 0.230 0.351 1.53 0.104 0.076
Table 9: Descriptive Tax Statistics: Unmarried Households, Two Children
Multiples of Avg. Tax Rate Marg. Tax Rate Marg./Avg. Avg. Tax Rate Marg. Tax Rate
Mean Income (Mean) (Mean) (St. Deviation) (St. Deviation)
0.10 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000
0.25 0.000 0.082 - 0.004 0.075
0.50 0.016 0.148 9.25 0.022 0.018
0.75 0.062 0.151 2.44 0.023 0.021
1.0 0.091 0.237 2.60 0.031 0.062
1.5 0.133 0.275 2.07 0.035 0.025
2.0 0.144 0.281 1.95 0.057 0.034
3.0 0.181 0.301 1.66 0.067 0.058
4.0 0.221 0.329 1.49 0.046 0.055
5.0 0.236 0.348 1.47 0.058 0.052
7.0 0.233 0.342 1.47 0.069 0.075
10.0 0.253 0.353 1.40 0.085 0.081
20Table 10: Descriptive Tax Statistics: Unmarried Households, Two + Children
Multiples of Avg. Tax Rate Marg. Tax Rate Marg./Avg. Avg. Tax Rate Marg. Tax Rate
Mean Income (Mean) (Mean) (St. Deviation) (St. Deviation)
0.1 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000
0.2 0.000 0.040 - 0.000 0.066
0.5 0.009 0.146 16.22 0.019 0.023
0.75 0.040 0.151 3.78 0.025 0.015
1.0 0.069 0.200 2.90 0.037 0.070
1.5 0.106 0.267 2.52 0.040 0.038
2.0 0.126 0.261 2.07 0.036 0.045
3.0 0.167 0.307 1.84 0.045 0.021
4.0 0.196 0.316 1.61 0.039 0.041
5.0 0.207 0.351 1.70 0.102 0.052
7.0 0.265 0.393 1.48 0.058 0.037
10.0 0.288 0.385 1.34 0.063 0.045
Table 11: Tax Rate Distribution
Statistic Married Unmarried
% with zero taxes 14.5% 31.8%
Median Tax rate 8.0% 5.6%
Mean Tax rate 8.8% 6.4%
Tax Rate De￿ning
Bottom 80% 13.5% 10.3%
Bottom 90% 16.5% 14.0%
Bottom 95% 19.5% 17.0%
Bottom 99% 27.5% 22.5%
21Table 12: Distribution of Tax Liabilities
Percentile Share of Total














Table 13: Before and After-Tax Income Distribution Statistics
Before Tax After Tax
Percentile Share of Share of
Total Income Total Income
Bottom 20% 3.4% 3.8%
20-40 % 6.9% 7.7%
40-60 % 11.6% 12.5%
60-80 % 18.8% 19.7%
80-90 % 14.3% 14.5%
90-95 % 10.2% 10.1%
95-99 % 14.5% 13.8%
99 -99.5 % 4.0% 3.7%
99.5-100 % 16.2% 14.3%
Other Statistics
Gini Coe¢ cient 0.554 0.522
Var-log Income 0.85 0.76
22Table 14: Parametric Estimates: Log-speci￿cation, All and Married Households
Estimates All Married Married Married Married Married
(all) No Children One Child Two Children Two + Children
￿ 0.0400 0.0638 0.0582 0.0704 0.0789 0.0838
￿ 0.1127 0.0924 0.1028 0.0942 0.0763 0.0577
St. Errors
￿ 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003 0.0005
￿ 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
Table 15: Parametric Estimates: Log-speci￿cation, Unmarried Households
Estimates All No Children One Child Two Children Two + Children
￿ 0.0451 0.0481 0.0726 0.0819 0.0787
￿ 0.1298 0.1392 0.1071 0.09 0.0721
St. Errors
￿ 0.0003 0.0003 0.0012 0.002 0.0042
￿ 0.0003 0.0003 0.0007 0.0011 0.002
Table 16: Parametric Estimates: GS speci￿cation, All and Married Households
Estimates All Married Married Married Married Married
(all) No Children One Child Two Children Two + Children
b 0.2627 0.2471 0.2338 0.2746 0.2848 0.2897
s 0.0123 0.0006 0.0032 0.0029 0.0007 0.0001
p 0.9723 1.85 1.493 1.364 1.687 2.085
St. Errors
b 0.0015 0.0008 0.0011 0.0023 0.0017 0.002
s 0.0001 0.00003 0.0002 0.0002 0.00005 0.00001
p 0.006 0.0143 0.0189 0.0217 0.021 0.034
Table 17: Parametric Estimates: GS speci￿cation, Unmarried Households
Estimates All No Children One Child Two Children Two + Children
b 0.2346 0.2462 0.2254 0.2524 0.286
s 0.0074 0.0311 0.0012 0.0002 0.0003
p 1.415 0.8969 1.872 2.271 1.866
St. Errors
b 0.0022 0.0027 0.0064 0.01 0.0275
s 0.0003 0.0005 0.0003 0.00008 0.0002
p 0.0194 0.0131 0.098 0.152 0.23
23Table 18: Marginal Tax Rates: Statutory Rates, Log and GS Speci￿cations
Multiples of Marginal Tax Rate Marginal Tax Rate Marginal Tax Rate
Mean Income Statutory Log Speci￿cation GS Speci￿cation
(Mean) (Mean) (Mean)
0.10 0.001 0.009 0.006
0.25 0.073 0.068 0.029
0.50 0.132 0.112 0.084
0.75 0.147 0.138 0.133
1.0 0.189 0.156 0.169
1.5 0.264 0.182 0.209
2.0 0.277 0.200 0.226
3.0 0.297 0.226 0.239
4.0 0.326 0.245 0.243
5.0 0.340 0.259 0.245
7.0 0.355 0.280 0.246
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